Brief of Joseph E. Stiglitz as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners by Stiglitz, Joseph E.
 No. 13-990 
IN THE 
Supreme Court of the United States 
 
REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
NML CAPITAL LTD., ET AL., 
Respondents. 
 
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
 
BRIEF OF JOSEPH STIGLITZ  
AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITIONER 
         
    Deepak Gupta 
      Counsel of Record 
    Peter Conti-Brown 
    GUPTA BECK PLLC 
    1625 Massachusetts Avenue, NW 
    Suite 500 
    Washington, DC 20036 
    (202) 888-1741 
    deepak@guptabeck.com 
 
    Counsel for Amicus Curiae 
March 24, 2014 
  
-i- 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Authorities .............................................................. ii 
Introduction  .......................................................................... 1 
Interest of Amicus Curiae .................................................... 2 
Statement of the Case .......................................................... 2 
Argument ............................................................................... 5 
I. The Second Circuit’s decision subverts the 
orderly restructuring of sovereign debt. . ................ 5 
 A. The decision below would prevent 
debtor nations from issuing new debt if 
even one holdout creditor refuses to  
participate in the restructuring.  ..................... 5 
 B. Sovereign debt restructuring 
programs are particularly vulnerable 
to the demands of holdout creditors. ............... 8 
 C. By impeding orderly restructuring, 
the Second Circuit’s decision under-
mines sovereign debt markets and 
thereby harms developing countries. ............ 12 
II. The Second Circuit’s decision, if allowed to 
stand, will harm U.S. financial markets.  ............... 15 
Conclusion ............................................................................ 18 
Biographical Appendix ............................................... App. 1  
  
-ii- 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
 
Michael Bradley, James D. Cox, and Mitu Gulati, 
The Market Reaction to Legal Shocks and 
Their Antidotes: Lessons from the Sovereign 
Debt Market, 39 J. Legal Stud. 289 (2010) ......................... 11 
Robert Chote, “March 2013 Economic and Fiscal 
Outlook Briefing,” U.K. Office for Budget 
Responsibility (2013) ............................................................. 14 
Udaibir S. Das et al., “Sovereign Debt Restruc-
turings 1950-2010: Literature Survey, Data, 
and Stylized Facts,” IMF Working Paper 
(2012) ....................................................................................... 17 
Barry Eichengreen, “Restructuring Sovereign 
Debt,” 17 J. Econ. Perspectives 75 (2003) .......................... 16 
Jaime Guajardo, Daniel Leigh, and Andrea 
Pescatori, “Expansionary Austerity: New 
International Evidence,” IMF Working Paper 
(2011) ....................................................................................... 14 
International Monetary Fund, “Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring—Recent Developments and 
Implications for the Fund’s Legal and Policy 
Framework” (2013) .......................................................... 10, 16 
Anne O. Krueger, A New Approach to Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring (2002) .................................................... 13 
Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Sovereign Debt: Notes on 
Theoretical Frameworks and Policy Anal-
yses,” in Barry Herman, et al., eds., Overcom-
ing Developing Country Debt Crises 35-69 
(2010) ......................................................................................... 8 
Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Stiglitz Report: Reforming 
the International Monetary and Financial 
Systems in the Wake of the Global Crisis 




Sovereign governments fund themselves to a large 
extent through public debt markets. The contracts for 
sovereign debts are thus essential to the operation of 
governments, and, in turn, the global economy. As with 
any financial enterprise, the contracts also provide 
guidance on what will occur in the event that the 
government cannot pay as promised. But the legal 
meaning of those contracts is irretrievably intertwined 
with the economic meaning; governments and bondhold-
ers alike care about the law because it guides their 
behavior. In other words, legal interpretations in this 
context can have profound consequences for the way that 
governments fund themselves and develop their 
economies.  
Professor Joseph Stiglitz files this brief to explain 
how the Second Circuit’s decision in this case—if left 
standing by this Court—will threaten to upend global 
sovereign-debt markets, harm developing nations, and 
challenge New York’s position as a global financial 
capital.1 No rational creditor would participate in a 
restructuring under the Second Circuit’s legal regime. 
Accepting partial payment initially is foolish when the 
                                                  
1 Counsel of record for all parties received notice of Professor 
Stiglitz’s intent to file this brief at least ten days before its due date. 
The parties have provided blanket consent to the filing of amicus 
briefs. No counsel for a party wrote this brief in whole or in part, 
and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to 
fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person other 
than amicus curiae or its counsel made a monetary contribution 
intended to fund its preparation or submission.  
In addition to Professor Stiglitz and his counsel, this brief was 
prepared with the pro bono assistance of Dr. Michael Cragg, Dr. 




law allows, even compels, full payment eventually. At the 
very least, the Second Circuit’s decision severely 
impedes potential debt restructurings under standard 
debt contracts and subverts debtors’ ability to start anew 
when they cannot pay back creditors. In the process, a 
basic principle of modern capitalism—that when debtors 
cannot pay back creditors, a fresh start is needed—has 
been overturned. This Court should step in and set 
things straight.  
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
Joseph Stiglitz is an economist and University Pro-
fessor at Columbia University. In 2001, he received the 
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics. From 1993 to 1997, 
he served as a member and then Chairman of the White 
House Council of Economic Advisers. From 1997 to 2000, 
he served as Chief Economist and Senior Vice President 
of the World Bank.  
As both a policymaker and scholar, Professor Stiglitz 
has been extensively involved in the formulation of 
financial and fiscal policy. As a policymaker and adviser, 
he has participated in numerous sovereign debt 
restructurings and advised various countries on fiscal 
issues closely related to those implicated by this case. As 
a scholar, he has published hundreds of peer-reviewed 
articles and more than 25 books in theoretical and 
empirical economics, including extensive publications on 
the economic implications of financial, fiscal, and 
monetary policy. A more complete description of his 
biography is included in the appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The problems that gave rise to this case began a 
dozen years ago, when Argentina had no choice but to 
devalue its currency and default on its debt. Under the 
regime in control of Argentina at the time, the country’s 
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economy and fiscal position were rapidly declining and 
unemployment was soaring. The country devalued its 
currency and simultaneously invited its many creditors 
to sort through and restructure its outstanding debts.  
Devaluation and debt restructuring worked. In 
subsequent years, until the global financial crisis erupted 
in 2008, Argentina’s annual GDP growth was 8% or 
higher, one of the fastest rates in the world. Even former 
creditors benefited from this rebound. In a highly 
innovative move, Argentina exchanged old debt for new 
debt—at about 30 cents on the dollar or a little more—
plus a GDP-indexed bond. The more Argentina grew, the 
more it paid its former creditors. 
Argentina’s interests and those of its creditors were 
thus aligned: both wanted to see the Argentine economy 
grow. It was the equivalent of a frequent strategy used 
in the American corporate-debt context, where, under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, a distressed 
company will swap its debt for equity, with old 
bondholders becoming new shareholders. 
Of course, debt restructurings are not always strict-
ly harmonious affairs; there are often conflicts among 
different claimants. To address these conflicts in private 
debt disputes, countries have bankruptcy laws and 
courts. These courts serve as referees to the restructur-
ing process to ensure that the law is followed, even if 
some debtors or some creditors would prefer different 
results. The law sets forth clear criteria for priority of 
claimants, and, under some circumstances, can force 
reluctant creditors to accept a restructuring that entails 
a “haircut” on their claims, in the interests of all the 
creditors.   
There is no such court or referee for distressed 
governments and their creditors. Once upon a time, such 
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contracts were enforced by armed intervention, as 
Mexico, Venezuela, Egypt, and a host of other countries 
learned at great cost in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. A peaceful, orderly, predictable, and 
objective mechanism—of the kind taken for granted in 
the private corporate context—is simply unavailable for 
sovereign debt restructurings.  
Some countries with large enough economies come 
to the negotiating table on equal or better terms with 
their creditors. The poorer the country, the less likely 
this is to be true. Poor countries are typically at a huge 
disadvantage in bargaining with big multinational 
lenders, which are usually backed by powerful home-
country governments. Often, debtor countries are 
squeezed so hard for payment that they are bankrupt 
again after a few years. 
In its currency devaluation and debt restructuring, 
Argentina sought to avoid this outcome, especially with 
the issuance of GDP-linked bonds. And economists and 
other outsiders applauded its effort. But others saw an 
opportunity to make huge profits at the expense of the 
Argentine people. They bought the old bonds at a 
fraction of their face value, and then used the current 
litigation to try to force Argentina to pay 100 cents on 
the dollar, including principal and accrued interest—far 
more than nearly all other creditors and outside experts 
agreed was required to ensure Argentina’s successful 
exit from default. 
The late-coming bondholders’ litigation strategy 
seeks to take advantage of a standard contractual clause 
(called pari passu, Latin for “with an equal step” or “on 
equal footing”). The Second Circuit has interpreted the 
clause in this case to mean that if Argentina paid in full 
the interest on new debt issued in the restructuring, it 
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had to pay the holdouts in full the principal and 
cumulative interest on debt from before the restructur-
ing that had never been exchanged. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Second Circuit’s decision subverts the orderly 
restructuring of sovereign debt. 
A. The decision would prevent debtor nations 
from issuing new debt if even one holdout  
creditor refuses to participate in the  
restructuring. 
 The Second Circuit’s decision gives a small group of 
creditors the incentive to hold out on sovereign debt 
restructurings. The pari passu clause has long been a 
standard term in sovereign debt contracts. This makes 
good economic sense: For financial markets to function, 
participants must have some assurance that one set of 
bondholders will not be ranked above or below another. 
The pari passu clause provides this type of assurance.  
But the Second Circuit’s opinion—which builds on its 
previous affirmance of the district court’s injunction—
has determined that the clause protects those creditors 
who refuse to deal, no matter the consequences, no 
matter the efforts by the debtor to restructure that debt. 
Under the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the pari 
passu clause, the clause becomes a guarantee that any 
future creditor of any future bond issuance will not 
receive payment before the holdouts of any previous 
restructuring. So long as these holdouts can outlast the 
debtor and the debtor’s attempts to move on with 
payment through the restructuring, they can effectively 
thwart the debtor’s ability to issue future debt, whether 
as part of the restructuring—as occurred here—or at 
any time thereafter. 
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In the specific case of Argentina, the vast majority 
(over 90 percent) of the country’s creditors accepted its 
restructuring proposal, while only a small group elected 
to “hold out” for better terms. But given the Second 
Circuit’s ruling, the holdout group will receive far better 
terms than the vast majority of creditors. That is, the 
holdout group will obtain full payment on Argentina’s 
pre-default obligations—both principal and cumulative 
interest on defaulted bonds—rather than payment on 
the (marked down) restructured debt provided to 
creditors that participated in the restructuring plan. 
Indeed, the rule goes further than that: Both the 
holdouts and the creditors who have accepted restructur-
ing have already received compensation for the risk of 
default through returns received on the original bonds. 
Because any loan is a voluntary transaction, lenders’ 
required return for their provision of capital increases 
with the probability of borrower default. Under the logic 
of the Second Circuit’s ruling, however, holdouts would 
receive high pre-default returns while never actually 
bearing the risk of default.   
If left in place, the Second Circuit’s treatment of 
holdout creditors will have a severely negative impact on 
the public interest, in this case and in a wide array of 
sovereign debt restructurings, past and future.  
This disruption will occur for two reasons. First, the 
decision benefits holdouts at the expense of the majority 
of creditors who have accepted debt restructuring. Such 
treatment will discourage creditors from participating in 
a voluntary restructuring, disrupting the already 
delicate and complex process of restructuring sovereign 
debt.  
Second, and closely related, because no creditors 
would opt for partial payment at the beginning of the 
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restructuring process when they can hold out for full 
payment at the end, restructuring under the Second 
Circuit’s rule would deny debtor nations the benefits of a 
fresh start. If the Second Circuit’s ruling remains the 
law, attempts at restructuring would simply create new 
uncertainty about the country’s future and the size of its 
debt burden. This uncertainty itself would impede 
growth and access to credit, diminishing greatly the 
benefits of restructuring.   
These considerations explain why national govern-
ments and organizations have voiced support for 
Argentina in its continuing struggle with holdout 
creditors. The governments of France and the United 
States have supported Argentina’s position against the 
claims of its holdout creditors for policy reasons 
consistent with the principles that amicus explains here.2  
As recognized by the U.S. Department of Justice, 
rewarding holdouts “could enable a single creditor to 
thwart the implementation of an internationally 
supported restructuring plan, and thereby undermine 
the decades of effort the United States has expended to 
encourage a system of cooperative resolution of 
sovereign debt crises.”3 
  
                                                  
2 Br. of Republic of France in Support of Petitioner in Republic 
of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., No. 12-1494 (2d Cir. Jul. 26, 
2013); Br. of United States in Support of Reversal, in NML Capital, 
Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105 (2d Cir. Apr. 4, 2012); Br. 
of United States in Support of Rehearing, NML Capital, Ltd. v. 
Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105 (2d Cir. Dec. 28, 2012). 
3 Br. of United States in Support of Reversal, in NML Capital, 
Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105 (2d Cir. Apr. 4, 2012), at 5. 
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B. Sovereign debt restructuring programs are 
particularly vulnerable to the demands of 
holdout creditors. 
It is well accepted that bankruptcy is essential when 
changes in economic circumstances leave a firm or 
household with excess debt. In fact, it is hard to conceive 
of modern capitalism without bankruptcy laws to 
prioritize creditors and otherwise govern the allocation 
of private debtor resources.4  
Analogously, sovereign debt restructuring is essen-
tial when a country becomes encumbered with a non-
sustainable debt burden in the wake of various kinds of 
economic shocks. But the sovereign debt market has 
long had to manage in the absence of a sovereign debt 
restructuring mechanism (SDRM) that would specify an 
orderly restructuring process.5  This is why the Second 
Circuit’s decision has the potential to cause severe 
disruption in the sovereign debt market generally and 
sovereign debt restructuring specifically. 
                                                  
4 Of course, the design of bankruptcy law entails complex issues 
of equity and efficiency and the fact that such laws differ across 
countries and over time should make it clear that there is not a 
single right answer to the question of what is the right bankruptcy 
law. But there are some bankruptcy laws that are inefficient and 
sovereign debt contracts and restructuring processes can also be 
inefficient. In particular, amicus does not believe that any efficient 
market would have knowingly incorporated a pari passu clause that 
could be interpreted in the manner provided by the Second Circuit, 
for reasons explained below. 
5 As discussed in the economic literature, the lack of an SDRM 
makes the process of restructuring sovereign debt costly and 
complex. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Sovereign Debt: Notes on 
Theoretical Frameworks and Policy Analyses,” in Barry Herman, et 
al., eds., Overcoming Developing Country Debt Crises 35-69 (2010). 
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With an accepted SDRM in place, sovereign debt 
restructuring programs would be far less vulnerable to 
the demands of individual holdout creditors. Just as 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code governs the process 
for restructuring corporate debt, the SDRM itself would 
govern the restructuring process rather than the specific 
terms of particular contracts associated with the debt.  
Recognizing the critical need for an SDRM, the 
International Monetary Fund pushed this initiative 
forward in the early years of this century. Although 
nothing came of the Fund’s SDRM initiative, the 
creation of such a mechanism has remained a top priority 
for global economic reform.6 
This reality—that there is not now an SDRM and 
there is yet little prospect of establishing one in the near 
future—increases creditors’ incentives to act opportunis-
tically in a way that, for example, the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code would not permit. The Second Circuit has 
suggested that the holdout problem can be resolved by 
simple changes in contract design, such as a collective 
action clause (CAC) designed to limit individual 
creditors’ ability to initiate litigation. Amicus does not 
believe that CACs are an effective remedy for the 
difficulties associated with obtaining agreement on a 
sovereign debt restructuring program. If it were so easy 
to resolve such issues by private contract, then 
bankruptcy laws and bankruptcy courts would not be 
                                                  
6 For example, in 2010, the President of the General Assembly 
of the United Nations created a Commission of Experts on Reforms 
of the International Monetary and Financial System that explicitly 
discussed the importance of establishing an SDRM. Amicus chaired 
this commission; its findings are published in Joseph E. Stiglitz, The 
Stiglitz Report: Reforming the International Monetary and 
Financial Systems in the Wake of the Global Crisis (2010). 
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such an integral part of the financial system in the 
United States—private contracting would exist in the 
corporate-debt context, making bankruptcy courts 
superfluous. This is not just the case in the United 
States: As far as amicus is aware, no advanced country 
has been able to manage efficient restructuring of 
private debts through exclusive reliance on collective-
action clauses.   
If CACs are insufficient in the private bankruptcy 
context, they are even more insufficient in sovereign 
debt restructurings, which are more complex than 
private bankruptcies, not least because there is no clear 
set of assets available to be distributed in the event of 
restructuring. 
The flaws in a CAC model of preventing holdouts are 
clear in practice as well as in theory. One key factor 
limiting the efficacy of CACs in debt restructurings is 
the problem posed by “aggregation.” A CAC applies only 
to a single bond issue. However, when there are many 
series of bonds, some more senior than others, one must 
determine how to add up the voting rights of each set of 
creditors. In one possible set of rules, the problem of 
holdouts reappears: If every group has to give its 
qualified majority approval, a majority associated with 
only one bond issuance could hold up restructuring 
across all issuances.7 But if the rules were designed to 
avoid this problem, some set of claimants could overrule 
other claimants, perhaps unfairly. For example, when 
Greece restructured its debt, all of its domestic-law 
creditors participated in the restructuring under a 
                                                  
7 This point is discussed, for example, in a recent report: 
International Monetary Fund, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring—
Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s Legal and 
Policy Framework,” 31 (2013). 
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statutory mechanism: there could be no domestic 
holdouts. By contrast, holdout creditors owning about 
30% of the foreign-law debt could not be forced to 
participate in the restructuring even though these 
instruments contained CACs; this was because the 
holdouts obtained blocking stakes in 19 of the 36 relevant 
bond series.8    
Recent empirical work confirms the limited useful-
ness of CACs for addressing the holdout problem. For 
example, a paper by Bradley, Cox, and Gulati analyzes 
the effectiveness of CACs in reducing the yield spread 
between sovereign debt and U.S. Treasuries using a 
sample of 312 sovereign-bond issuances subject to New 
York law. This study concludes that “the CAC contrac-
tual solution, which was supposed to provide a mecha-
nism by which the markets could deal with the holdout 
problem on their own, appears to have had provided little 
confidence, at least within the time frame we examine 
here.”9  
Of course, even if CACs facilitated sovereign debt 
restructuring going forward, there are still billions of 
dollars in outstanding debt contracts without these 
clauses. Hence, regardless of the utility of CACs in 
facilitating future restructurings, the Second Circuit 
opinion, if it becomes the law, would imperil the 
functioning of sovereign debt markets for the foreseea-
ble future.  
  
                                                  
8 Id. at 28-29. 
9 Michael Bradley, James D. Cox, and Mitu Gulati, The Market 
Reaction to Legal Shocks and Their Antidotes: Lessons from the 
Sovereign Debt Market, 39 J. Legal Stud. 289 (2010). 
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C. By impeding orderly restructuring, the Second 
Circuit’s decision undermines sovereign debt 
markets and thereby harms developing coun-
tries. 
Orderly restructurings are an important aspect of 
well-functioning sovereign debt markets. In a sovereign 
debt restructuring, the goal is to balance the benefits of 
economic recovery and growth (which accrue to both 
citizens and creditors) with the obligation to pay 
creditors. Investors in riskier sovereign debt understand 
that when a credit event occurs, a reduction in the debt 
burden allows the country to grow GDP and reduce its 
unemployment rate, while providing creditors with some 
return on their initial loan. This restructuring allows the 
debtor nation to break out of the vicious cycle of negative 
growth and decreasing investment and replace it with a 
virtuous cycle of positive growth and increasing 
investment.10   
In the past, despite the absence of an SDRM, sover-
eign nations in fiscal distress have been able to 
restructure their debt in a more or less orderly fashion. 
After restructuring their debt and pursuing attendant 
                                                  
10 As noted, the analog to a successful sovereign debt restructur-
ing in the private context is a corporate bankruptcy. In a corporate 
bankruptcy, investors typically suffer some losses, but the reduction 
in debt allows the firm to emerge from bankruptcy as a going 
concern able to raise finance for its operations in the normal way. 
Successful restructurings are good for both debtor and creditor, just 
as a successful Chapter 11 workout returns more value to holders of 
distressed debt than would a fire sale of corporate assets. From the 
perspective of efficiency, a sovereign debt restructuring is efficient 
if the gains of the debtor are sufficiently great that it more than 
compensates, ex ante, not only for the losses of the creditor, but also 




economic reforms, many developing countries have been 
able to regain a stable footing and once again obtain 
external financing on regular terms. But where the 
Second Circuit’s decision applies, adverse situations that 
would otherwise have led to a reasonably orderly 
restructuring of sovereign debt will instead lead to 
impasse.  
If the Second Circuit’s decision is left standing, 
governments faced with unsustainable levels of debt may 
try to struggle on with a stagnant or shrinking economy 
even though a speedy restructuring would have allowed 
growth to resume.11 Alternatively, such governments 
may default but—with no way to overcome the holdout 
problem—they will have no incentive to offer any 
recovery to creditors. Unable to restructure, govern-
ments that default could be permanently shut out from 
the debt market, with consequential adverse effects on 
development and economic growth prospects. 
For a developing country, access to financing is 
particularly important both during an economic crisis 
and during the subsequent recovery period. Access to 
external financing enables governments to maintain key 
                                                  
11 There are significant costs of default for the debtor country, 
particularly if restructuring is expected to take a long time. For 
example: “The absence of a predictable, orderly, and rapid process 
for restructuring the debts of sovereigns that are implementing 
appropriate policies has a number of costs. It can lead a sovereign 
with unsustainable debts to delay seeking a restructuring, draining 
its reserves and leaving the debtor and the majority of its creditors 
worse off.” Anne O. Krueger, A New Approach to Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring 2 (2002). Even under current arrangements (as they 
were understood prior to the Second Circuit’s decision), the costs of 
restructuring are sufficiently large that many countries delay 




spending commitments while the economy is recovering 
and is temporarily unable to generate sufficient tax 
revenue to balance the budget. Without external 
financing, a developing country is constrained to run a 
balanced budget every year. For many countries, this 
would be impractical under normal circumstances, and is 
impossible when the economy is in crisis. Investment 
programs are, by their nature, a long-term commitment 
of funds, whereas government revenues are often highly 
volatile and may be exposed, for example, to the vagaries 
of international commodity prices.  
The less external financing is available, the more a 
country is required to rely on current tax revenues to 
fund government spending. The “austerity measures” 
implemented in Greece and other European countries in 
the wake of the global financial crisis are informative 
here: Unsustainable debt burdens were not reduced 
sufficiently through restructuring, and, as a result, 
economies have performed very poorly post restructur-
ing, sometimes necessitating further debt restructuring. 
Recent research by the IMF and others has concluded 
that austerity programs, including those that are 
necessitated by lack of access to finance, weaken the 
economy.12  
It is also important to recognize that the Second 
Circuit decision, if not reversed by the Court, could 
imperil the IMF’s and the World Bank’s ability to 
perform essential functions. These institutions have 
traditionally engaged in crisis lending, with the 
understanding that they have priority over other 
                                                  
12 Jaime Guajardo, Daniel Leigh, and Andrea Pescatori, “Ex-
pansionary Austerity: New International Evidence,” IMF Working 
Paper (2011); Robert Chote, “March 2013 Economic and Fiscal 
Outlook Briefing,” U.K. Office for Budget Responsibility (2013).  
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creditors. The pari passu clause has never been invoked, 
partly because there has been a common understanding 
that it does not apply to such payments.  
But if the pari passu clause can be extended in the 
way held by the Second Circuit—that is, that subsequent 
debt can never be paid more fully than previous debt, 
even for different issuances—a private creditor could 
well challenge such payments to the IMF and the World 
Bank, as well as to other official lenders. France has 
already expressed such fears. The system of develop-
ment and crisis financing that has emerged over the past 
sixty years could be jeopardized if the Second Circuit’s 
decision stands. At the very least, a new level of 
uncertainty has been added to global financial markets, 
at great cost to the global economy.   
II.  The Second Circuit’s decision, if allowed to stand, 
will harm U.S. financial markets. 
When sovereign debt is issued, both the borrower 
and the creditor hope that the debt will be repaid in full 
in a timely way as set forth in the contract. But both 
parties also recognize that events may occur that will 
necessitate a debt restructuring, a postponement of 
payments and/or a reduction in the value of the principal. 
That is why the interest rate paid on developing 
countries’ sovereign debt, for instance, is considerably 
higher than that paid by the U.S. government. As noted 
above, the higher interest rate is compensation for the 
risk lenders face.   
In order for sovereign debt markets to function well 
(with interest rates at reasonable levels), it is necessary 
to have sensible rules governing the sovereign debt 
restructuring process. This is because the nature of the 
restructuring process affects the willingness of both the 
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lenders to lend and the borrowers to borrow, and the 
equilibrium interest rate charged in the market. Before 
the Second Circuit’s ruling, if restructuring was 
necessary it could be carried out (in the absence of a 
clear SDRM) through a process of negotiation. Interest 
rates on sovereign debt reflected the possibility of future 
restructuring on that basis. 
From the perspective of participants in the global 
sovereign debt market—creditors and debtors alike—
one reasonable response to the problem posed by the 
Second Circuit’s decision could be to stop issuing debt in 
New York (which is closely tied to the choice of New 
York law as the governing legal jurisdiction in the bond 
contracts). A developing country with its citizens’ long-
term interests in mind will be more likely to issue its 
debt in England, for example, where individual 
bondholders are unable to initiate legal proceedings and 
therefore the holdout problem created by the Second 
Circuit’s decision does not exist.13 
Currently, the New York financial markets play a 
vital role in the issuance of emerging market sovereign 
bonds. Because New York law governs bonds issued 
through the New York financial market, New York law 
also plays an important role in debt restructuring. As of 
March 2009, New York law governed almost 70 percent 
of all outstanding emerging market bonds issued 
internationally, with English law accounting for most of 
the remaining issuances (22.2%). By March 2009, 
approximately one quarter of a trillion dollars ($272 
                                                  
13 See Barry Eichengreen, “Restructuring Sovereign Debt,” 17 
J. Econ. Perspectives 75 (2003); IMF, “Sovereign Debt Restructur-
ing—Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s Legal 
and Policy Framework,” at 14. 
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billion) in outstanding emerging market bonds was 
governed by New York law.14 
But if the Second Circuit’s decision is allowed to 
stand, borrowers would have a strong incentive to seek 
other jurisdictions where courts seem less prejudiced 
against borrowers and where the pari passu clause, 
intended to insure all borrowers are treated equally and 
fairly, is not reinterpreted to give holdouts preferential 
treatment. Indeed, amicus believes that if the Second 
Circuit’s interpretation of the pari passu clause had 
been the prevailing interpretation at the time Argentina 
issued its debts, Argentina would not and should not 
have been willing to borrow at the interest rate offered 
by the market. The cost would have been simply too 
high. Though borrowers and creditors may seek new 
language to restore what was intended by the pari passu 
clause, inevitably there will be uncertainty about how 
such language might be interpreted in later litigation. 
The Second Circuit acknowledged the problem of 
sovereign debt flight just described, but does not believe 
that its decision will steer bond issuers away from the 
New York marketplace. Rather, the Second Circuit 
believes that going forward, sovereigns and lenders will 
be free to devise various mechanisms, including CACs 
and alternative pari passu language, to avoid holdout 
litigation. As described above, the Second Circuit’s 
opinion relies on an overly sanguine view of the efficacy 
of CACs, which conflicts with economic logic and 
evidence. Given the uncertainty surrounding CACs and 
their efficacy, it is far easier—for creditors and debtors 
alike—to simply ignore the issue and choose English law 
                                                  
14 Udaibir S. Das et al., “Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-
2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts,” IMF Working 
Paper 41 (2012). 
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to govern sovereign debt contracts. Doing so removes 
uncertainty and ensures that the essential process of 
debt restructuring can still occur. If the Second Circuit’s 
view of pari passu is left standing, New York law no 
longer provides that certainty. 
CONCLUSION 
 The petition for certiorari should be granted.  
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